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About the Geiger Gibson / RCHN Community Health Foundation Research
Collaborative
The Geiger Gibson Program in Community Health Policy, established in 2003 and
named after human rights and health center pioneers Drs. H. Jack Geiger and Count
Gibson, is part of the School of Public Health and Health Services at The George
Washington University. It focuses on the history and contributions of health centers and
the major policy issues that affect health centers, their communities, and the patients
that they serve.
The RCHN Community Health Foundation, founded in October 2005, is a not-for-profit
foundation whose mission is to support community health centers through strategic
investment, outreach, education, and cutting-edge health policy research. The only
foundation in the country dedicated to community health centers, the Foundation builds
on health centers’ 40-year commitment to the provision of accessible, high quality,
community-based healthcare services for underserved and medically vulnerable
populations. The Foundation’s gift to the Geiger Gibson program supports health center
research and scholarship.
Additional information about the Research Collaborative can be found online at
www.gwumc.edu/sphhs/departments/healthpolicy/ggprogram or at rchnfoundation.org.
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Executive Summary
On March 31, 2011, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
released proposed regulations implementing the Medicare Shared Savings Program
(MSSP). The thrust of the MSSP is to promote savings to Medicare as well as the
greater clinical integration of health care through incentive payments to accountable
care organizations (ACOs) that meet Medicare standards for structure, performance,
and health care outcomes. The effort to spur greater clinical integration through the
MSSP was part of a broader set of reforms contained in the Affordable Care Act (ACA)
whose aim was to improve health care quality and efficiency. Among these reforms is
an $11 billion investment in community health centers, known as federally qualified
health centers (FQHCs) under the Medicare program. In 2009, health centers served
nearly 19 million low-income patients, including 1.4 million Medicare beneficiaries. By
law, health centers must provide comprehensive primary health care while also serving
as gateways to a full range of necessary care, including inpatient and specialty care.
Federal data on health center services show that primary care represents 98.2 percent
of all health care furnished by FQHCs.
Despite the broad aims of the ACA, CMS’ proposed rule bars participation by
health center-formed ACOs. Furthermore, while the rule permits health centers to be
ACO participants, it also prohibits the assignment of Medicare patients to ACOs for
shared savings purposes. Despite the absence of any legal barriers to FQHC
participation in the statute, CMS bases this exclusionary policy on the fact that the
FQHC payment method, which consists of a bundled payment for all primary health
care services furnished by FQHC staff, does not allow the agency to identify which
procedures are furnished by physicians, whose presence in care provision is a
requirement of the ACO statute. In medically underserved communities, however,
health care teams are essential because of the severe shortage of physicians;
furthermore, FQHCs use health care teams to ensure comprehensive care.
CMS policy has the potential to produce a series of downstream consequences,
most notably, the systemic exclusion of the poorest and most underserved patients from
the benefits of ACOs and the disincentivization of meaningful FQHC affiliation
agreements with hospitals and specialty groups participating in ACOs. The exclusion of
Medicare FQHC patients comes at a time when health centers have experienced
explosive growth in the number of Medicare patients served -- a doubling of patients
over the past decade, even as the number of low-income Medicare beneficiaries grew
by less than 10% nationwide.
The ACO statute provides the Secretary with the discretion to interpret the
statute’s assignment rule to recognize physicians as providers of health care regardless
of whether they furnish health care directly or as part of health care teams. Although
technical issues will arise in designing a shared savings methodology for health care
team arrangements that rely on bundled payments, this challenge ultimately pales
alongside the implications of excluding FQHC Medicare patients from the potential
benefits of ACO practice.
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Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) establishes a “Medicare
Shared Savings Program”1 (MSSP). The purpose of the program is to improve health
care by rewarding certain types of provider collaborations -- known under the law as
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) -- that are expected to control costs while
improving quality.2 Experts have identified ACOs as an important step forward in
achieving greater efficiency and quality in health care.3 Over time, ACO formation is
expected to become a major feature of the U.S. health care landscape, not only for
Medicare but for other sources of coverage such as Medicaid, CHIP, employersponsored health plans, and ultimately, qualified health plans (QHPs) sold in state
health insurance Exchanges. For this reason, the formation of ACOs is a matter of great
importance to the future of health care financing and access generally. Indeed, ACO
formation is a focus of the federal agencies that regulate competition within the health
care system as a whole.4
According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency
that oversees the MSSP, the program’s aims are to foster “(1) better health care for
individuals; (2) better health for populations; and (3) lower growth in expenditures.”5 By
promoting clinical integration through ACO formation and compensation, the ACA
reflects longstanding recognition of integration as central to improving the quality and
cost-effectiveness of health care.6 Congress’ decision to spur the formation of such
entities through creation of the MSSP comes at a critical time in U.S. health care, as
health care costs continue to rise far faster than the general rate of inflation and quality
measures continue to lag well behind those of other nations.
The use of Medicare payment incentives to spur ACO formation was part of a
broader set of health care quality and efficiency reforms contained in the ACA. Chief
among these other reforms was an $11 billion investment over the FY 2011-2015 time
period in the expansion of community health centers (known under Medicare and
Medicaid as federally qualified health centers, or FQHCs) in order to reach a far greater
number of rural and urban medically underserved communities, in preparation for the
coverage expansions due to take place in 2014. By law, health centers must affiliate
with other health care providers in order to promote health care quality and continuity
1

SSA §1899 (A)as added by PPACA §3022
§1899(a)(1)(A)
3
MedPAC, 2009 Report to Congress, Ch. 2 http://www.medpac.gov/chapters/jun09_CH02.pdf (Accessed
April 9, 2011)
4
See, e.g., FTC/DOJ Proposed Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (Notice with Comment Period)
http://www.ftc.gov/os/fedreg/2011/03/110331acofrn.pdf (Accessed April 9, 2011)
5
76 Fed. Reg. 19528, 19531 (April 7, 2011)
6
Clinical integration as a key aspect of health care quality improvement was recognized as early as the
1933 Report of the Committee on the Cost of Medical Care
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC402728/pdf/canmedaj00128-0076.pdf (Accessed April 9,
2011)
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and access to medically necessary inpatient and specialty care.7 Thus, viewed through
the wider lens of the ACA as a whole, it is evident that Congress sought to maximize
clinical integration across the health care system, in medically underserved
communities and elsewhere, through a combination of incentives and investments. In
the case of health centers, Congress’ vision was not simply to make primary health care
more accessible but also to assure that new primary care access points would serve as
gateways to comprehensive, high quality health care for medically underserved
populations. Because the purpose of the MSSP is to spur the types of integration that in
turn generate patient and population health improvements, health center patients in
particular stand to gain from this policy advance.
Among the nearly 19 million medically underserved patients served by health
centers in 2009 were nearly 1.4 million Medicare beneficiaries. Data from the Uniform
Data System (UDS), which collects information on all federally-funded health centers,
indicates that health center patients are overwhelmingly low income; more than 71%
have family incomes below 100% of the federal poverty level. While there exist no data
on the specific income characteristics of Medicare beneficiaries served by health
centers (the UDS provides information about patient income information separately from
information about insurance coverage), it is safe to assume that as residents of
medically underserved communities, Medicare patients resemble other patients in their
depressed economic circumstances.
How the CMS Proposed Rule Addresses Medicare Patients Served by Health
Centers
Despite the ACA’s overall emphasis on clinical quality improvement, the
Congressional investment in health centers, and, as CMS notes, FQHCs’ “critical role in
the health care system,”8 the proposed rule effectively places the potential benefits of
ACOs out of reach of medically underserved patients. The rule does so by not only
barring participation in the MSSP by health center-formed ACOs,9 but also by
disincentivizing ACOs from including health centers because of its prohibition of the
assignment of FQHC Medicare patients to ACOs for shared savings purposes.
Barring health center-formed ACOs from participation in the MSSP: Nothing in
the statute directly addresses the question of which ACO entities can participate in the
MSSP. Indeed, the statute states simply that “groups of providers of services and
suppliers meeting criteria specified by the Secretary may work together to manage and
coordinate care for Medicare-fee-for-service beneficiaries through an accountable care
organization.”10 Thus, the issue is left to the discretion of the Secretary. But the
proposed rule forbids participation by FQHC-formed ACOs,11 allowing access by
7

Sara Rosenbaum et. al., Assessing and Addressing Legal Barriers to Clinical Integration Among
Community Health Centers,” (Commonwealth Fund, 2011) [forthcoming]
8
76 Fed. Reg. 19528, 19538.
9
Id.
10
SSA §§1899(A)(1)(A) as added by PPACA §3022.
11
76 Fed. Reg. 19538.
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FQHCs (as well as rural health clinics, or RHCs) only if they participate in ACOs that are
permitted under the rule to be part of the MSSP.12
Barring inclusion of FQHC Medicare patients in ACOs for shared savings
purposes: Furthermore, inclusion of health centers in ACOs is disincentivized because
the proposed rule bars registered FQHC Medicare patients from being assigned to the
ACO in which a health center participates.
Both policies – barring participation by FQHC-formed ACOs and barring the
inclusion of Medicare FQHC patients – are the result of CMS’ position that for purposes
of shared savings, only those patients who receive care from physicians may be
counted. Reflecting the severe shortage of physicians in the communities in which they
operate, health centers use primary care teams; moreover, in furtherance of the
Medicare statute’s FQHC provisions, health centers are paid on an all-inclusive
encounter rate basis. Paradoxically, these two key factors, the shortage of physicians
and Medicare’s use of a bundled payment approach to pay FQHCs – the very payment
approach encouraged under the ACA, – mean, according to CMS, that it is not possible
to determine whether a Medicare FQHC patient has received any particular covered
treatment or procedure from a physician.
CMS’ conclusions are based on its interpretation of SSA §1899(c), the provision
of the ACO statute that addresses patient assignment. In CMS’ view, the statute
(§§1899(c) and (h)(1)(A)) specifies that the only patients who can be assigned to an
ACO for shared savings purposes are those whose care is furnished by a participating
health professional who is a physician. Because the primary care services furnished by
health centers are paid on a bundled basis, CMS concludes that CHC patients cannot
be assigned to an ACO because the physician’s precise role in care cannot be
ascertained.13 Thus, the exclusion of FQHC Medicare beneficiaries ultimately rests on
the absence of procedure codes under the FQHC payment system.
In order to counter the potential for total exclusion of FQHCs and their patients,
CMS proposes to create FQHC-related financial incentives. The first incentive exempts
“one-sided” ACOs from an otherwise applicable adjustment to their net savings
thresholds under the shared savings program if 50 percent or more of assigned
beneficiaries have at least one encounter with a participating FQHC.14 But since
registered Medicare FQHC patients cannot, under the terms of the CMS rule, count as
assigned ACO patients, this incentive appears to be linked to use of FQHCs by
assigned patients (that is, other patients seen by those ACO participating professionals
whose patients do count). Since assigned patients presumably are already under the
care of a participating physician, it is unlikely that 50 percent will visit an FQHC as well.

12

Id. CMS notes that “[i]t is, however, possible for [FQHCs] to join as an ACO participant in an ACO” that
has been formed by organizations recognized by CMS as authorized to form an ACO.
13
76 Fed. Reg. 19538, 19562
14
42 C.F.R. §425.7(c)(4)(iv)
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The second incentive comes in the form of an increase of up to 2.5 percentage
points in the final shared savings rate for a one-sided ACO (and up to 5 percentage
points in the case of a two-sided ACO) if the ACO includes “a” FQHC.15 However, as
with the net savings threshold bonus, in order to qualify for this shared savings bonus,
the ACO’s assigned patients must use the FQHC. As with the first incentive, use of the
FQHC by the FQHC’s patients does not count, because Medicare FQHC patients are
not considered assigned. Again, it is doubtful that patients under the care of
participating ACO physicians would also receive care from an FQHC.
In sum, while the ACO statute expressly recognizes the eligibility of many clinical
professionals other than physicians to participate in ACOs, CMS has interpreted the
provisions of the assignment statute to preclude assignment of patients to ACOs other
than those for whom care is provided by a physician. Because medically underserved
communities heavily depend on the use of health care teams that include a full range of
health care professionals (a practice encouraged under the broader provisions of the
ACA), the proposed rule effectively excludes patients whose communities lack primary
care physicians and that depend on health care teams to bridge this shortage.
Despite CMS’ express acknowledgment of the quality of health center services
and their “critical” role in health care, the rule thus achieves a result that effectively
excludes all patients served by one of Medicare’s most important sources of primary
health care for medically underserved populations. Patients of both FQHCs and RHCs
are adversely affected by this result, as are those under the care of nurse-managed
clinics and other practice arrangements that rely on primary health care professionals
other than physicians. Although CMS attempts to fashion an incentive to overcome the
impact of its interpretation, the incentive operates only in relation to assigned patients;
by definition, this incentive therefore excludes all FQHC Medicare patients.
Who Are the Medicare Patients Served by Health Centers?
Health centers play a considerable – and growing – role in caring for the most atrisk Medicare patients. Figure 1 shows that Medicare beneficiaries served by FQHCs
are a rapidly growing part of the FQHC patient population. Data from the UDS covering
the period 1996 - 2009 shows that over this time, the FQHC Medicare patient population
grew by 124%, with growth concentrated in the 1998 - 2009 time period.

15

42 C.F.R. §425.7(c)(7)
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Several underlying factors may account for this explosive growth. One possible
explanation is an increase in the number of health centers in operation and in the total
number of patients served; health centers grew from 686 to 1,131, while the total
number of patient served grew from 8.1 million to 18.8 million. But the Medicare patient
increase outstrips the overall patient increase. Another explanation may be a slight rise
in the number of low-income Medicare beneficiaries generally (Figure 2). Still another
explanation might be a decline in other sources of primary health care in medically
underserved communities.16 Yet another explanation might be a change in Medicare
and Medicaid payment policy under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA). The BBA
authorized state Medicaid programs to cease paying Medicare rates for dually eligible
beneficiaries. In the wake of the BBA, virtually all states took advantage of this flexibility
and eliminated Medicare-level payments for dually eligible beneficiaries. Given the fact
that FQHC Medicare patients are likely to be dually enrolled, a possible cause of the
growth is that as states ceased Medicare payment practices for dually eligible persons,
the number of private, dually participating physicians in these communities also
declined.

16

National Association of Community Health Centers, George Washington University, and the Robert
Graham Center, Access Transformed: Building a Primary Care Workforce for the 21st Century. 2008.
http://www.nachc.com/client/documents/ACCESS%20Transformed%20full%20report.PDF.
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Evidence drawn from the Medicare Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
underscores the elevated health risks experienced by low-income individuals dually
enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid. As shown in Figure 3, dual enrollees are over 1.5
times more likely to experience serious health limitations, more than twice as likely to
experience fair to poor health, nearly 3 times as likely to experience fair to poor mental
health, nearly twice as likely to experience diabetes, and over twice as likely to
experience asthma. Thus, dual enrollees are significantly more likely to experience not
only worse health, but also worse health arising from conditions whose outcomes can
be significantly improved through ambulatory care. They are precisely the patients
whose health outcomes might most improve through health care furnished in clinically
integrated systems.
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The Potential Downstream Effects of the Proposed Rule
By excluding health center-formed ACOs from participation, and by excluding
FQHC Medicare patients from the shared savings program, the proposed rule has the
potential to trigger a series of serious downstream effects.
1. The rule excludes the poorest beneficiaries with the highest health risks
Paradoxically, the proposed rule specifies that CMS will monitor ACOs to assure
that they do not attempt to avoid “at risk” beneficiaries,17 defined as “a beneficiary who
(1) has a high risk score on the CMS-HCC risk adjustment model; (2) is considered high
cost due to having two or more hospitalizations each year; (3) is dually eligible for
Medicare and Medicaid; (4) has a high utilization pattern; or (5) has had a recent
diagnosis that is expected to result in increased cost. Dual eligibility is sufficient to
trigger monitoring for avoidance, and yet by excluding the very primary care providers
that disproportionately treat dual enrollees, CMS essentially has excluded nearly 1.5
million FQHC Medicare beneficiaries from the program, as well as many more who
receive their care through clinical settings that rely on health care teams, such as
RHCs. As health centers expand, the number of poor beneficiaries excluded from this
important access and quality initiative will grow.

17

42 C.F.R. §425.12(b)
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2. The rule penalizes medically underserved communities that lack primary care
physicians, whose residents rely on health care teams and non-physician primary care
providers
Provision of care through health care teams has been identified as an important
measure of quality and efficiency; indeed, CMS itself discusses the importance of teams
in the Preamble to the rule. In medically underserved rural and urban communities the
use of health care teams and non-physician providers is essential, but the rule
penalizes their use as a result of the agency’s interpretation of the statute as limiting
assignment to patients cared for by physicians. This approach to the statute effectively
forecloses the growth of ACOs in communities that depend on health care teams.
3. The rule disincentivizes health center efforts to affiliate with hospitals and specialty
practices
In recent years, health centers have enjoyed major growth in affiliation activities,
and health center networks have grown as a means of improving quality and efficiency.
Of particular importance has been the growth in hospital/health center affiliation, both to
promote a more cost effective form of care for patients who otherwise depend on
emergency departments, and to improve the quality and continuity of care. For
example, Denver Health, which is nationally renowned for the quality of its care,18
provides much of its care through affiliated, independent FQHCs. To the extent that the
rule means that Denver Health’s affiliated Medicare FQHC patients cannot be assigned
to an ACO, the system’s ability to move forward would be adversely affected.
By disincentivizing health center participation in ACOs, either through health
center-formed ACOs or on an individual basis, the rule threatens to reverse this
movement toward greater affiliation. The structure of the rule’s FQHC incentive may
mean that no ACO will be able to claim credit for including an FQHC, since the incentive
is available only if assigned patients use the FQHC, and FQHC’s patients cannot be
assigned patients. Ironically, the CMS ACO interpretation coincides with a highly
important CMS initiative aimed at developing FQHCs into medical homes for Medicare
beneficiaries. To fully succeed as medical homes, of course, health centers participating
in the demonstration will need to be able to overcome clinical integration barriers on
behalf of patients who require specialty and inpatient care. The ACO rule, with its
shared savings incentive, might have helped health centers build such a continuum of
care; instead, the rule has the potential to undermine health centers’ ability to find
partners in care.
4. The rule has implications for the ability of health center patients to be counted in
other payers’ shared savings programs
It is widely expected that other payers such as Medicaid, CHIP, and private
health insurers and employer-sponsored plans will also begin to contract with ACOs on
18

See e.g., Patricia Gabow and Philip Mehler, A Broad And Structured Approach To Improving Patient
Safety And Quality: Lessons From Denver Health, Health Affairs 30:612-618 (April, 2011)
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a shared savings basis. Because of Medicare’s enormous influence on the health care
system, it is likely that these payers will utilize the Medicare ACO rules. Thus, it is
possible that health center-formed ACOs will be excluded from participation in state
Medicaid programs and furthermore, that health center patients will be excluded in other
payers’ shared savings programs. Such a result would be particularly unfortunate in the
case of Medicaid, because of the importance of quality and efficiency improvements in
that program. While the terms of the MSSP statute apply only to the Medicare program,
the reach of the statute’s methodology may ultimately extend much further.
An Alternative Approach to the Proposed Rule
Ultimately CMS’ interpretation of the statute’s assignment provision drives the
exclusion of health center patients from the MSSP. Section 1899(c) provides that “[t]he
Secretary shall determine the appropriate method to assign Medicare fee-for-service
beneficiaries to an ACO based on their utilization of primary care services provided
under this title by [a physician].” This section does not require that services be provided
directly by physicians, but only that physicians “provide” care. There are many ways to
provide care, and this flexibility is captured by §1899(b)(1)(E) of the statute, which gives
the Secretary the discretion to designate a broad range of ACOs and ACO participants.
Moreover, although FQHCs have begun to utilize procedure codes as part of
their Medicare billings, the simple fact is that, according to the publicly-available UDS
health center reports, 98.2 percent of all medical services provided by health centers in
2009 were furnished by primary care providers. To conclude that the absence of
procedure codes effectively negates the ability of FQHC Medicare patients to gain the
benefits of ACO formation and operation simply makes no sense. This position also
overlooks the provisions of the Medicare FQHC statute, which specifies physician
services as a core element of FQHC coverage and payment, along with the services of
other members of a health center’s health care team. Regardless of whether care at
health centers is provided directly by a physician in all cases, physicians are deeply
involved in the provision of primary care to all patients.
Furthermore, CMS’ de facto insertion of the word “directly” after “provided” under
its interpretation is at odds with the range of physician practice that is recognized under
state law. State law recognizes physicians as providers of health care – and
accountable for the quality of that care – whether they furnish the care directly or
provide such care by supervising (either directly or indirectly) the activities of other
health professionals.
To be sure, technical issues arise in fashioning a shared savings methodology
for use in health care settings in which primary care is furnished by teams and payment
is bundled. But this task is hardly insurmountable, and CMS has long been a leader in
payment innovation. Ultimately, developing such a payment incentive pales alongside
the long-term consequences of a policy that effectively excludes medically underserved
patients from participation in a major practice and quality advance.
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